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ABSTRACT 
This essay is written in pursuance of two tasks. First, it would challenge Marx‟s notion of 
„universal intellectual‟ from the perspective of Foucault‟s „specific intellectual‟. It is argued that 
Marx‟s universal intellectual is a political construction. It is flawed on account of its limited 
scope and deceptive understanding of modern society. Additionally and necessarily it is argued 
that Foucault‟s idea of „specific intellectual‟ is relatively strong and viable in the context of 
modern society. The second task of this paper is to defend Foucault‟s position against the charge 
leveled by Hoy and McCarthy that the notion of specific intellectual is highly individualistic and 
personal. The movement based upon this notion would necessarily fail to make appeal to the 
public. I argued that, in spite of being specific, intellectual can make appeal to the affected ones 
to bring about, of course not the global but local changes at precise points.  
 
Keywords: Universal intellectual, specific intellectual, transformation, global political 
movement, specific resistance. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
From the first days of inception, 14
th
 August, 1947, up to the present Pakistan faces problems of 
poverty, unemployment, exploitation by feuds and business class, mismanagement, corruption, 
class division, economic disparity, lack of strong and viable economic or political institutions 
etc. Despite material, class based exploitation deeply affecting the masses, this geographical 
region so far failed to invoke a single Marxist movement. However we cannot deny the 
enormous influence of Marxists, for example of Faiz Ahmad Faiz, Ahmad Nadim Qasimi, Zahir 
Kashmiri and Sahir Ludhianvi exerted upon local literature and languages. So far, these 
prominent progressive literary figures unable to translate the literary influence into mass 
mobilization. In face of various local forms of exploitation, failure to develop Marxist movement 
in Pakistan is a paradox or perhaps an important question that needs to be answered. 
The failure to provoke a successful local movement informed by Marxism may be explained 
with the factor that no serious attempt has been made on the part of local Marxists in Pakistan 
(Malik 1967). But this argument immediately fails on its face value.  If we critically evaluate the 
degree of success the Marxist movements attained in Europe, North and South America, Africa 
and Asia, despite the fact that local movements have long vibrant history, we can notice that the 
level of commitment has not been the issue. This fact takes me to explore the writings of Marx 
on the belief that the flaw may not lay in the commitment and sincerity on the part of political 
parties but rather in the core of Marx‟s thought. This fear or belief is further endorsed during my 
study of Foucault‟s works. Foucault traces the root cause of the failure of Marxism is not that 
Marxists are not sincere to the thought or ideology but the thought is itself a problem.  
In this paper I would just explore this critique of Marx‟s thought undertaken by Foucault. It is 
beyond the remit of this paper to show how the discourse of Marx led local movements to 
failure. I will focus upon Foucault‟s refutation of Marx.  The argument will proceed as follows. 
In the first part, the concept of universal intellectual proposed by Marx is explicated and 
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critiqued. This critique of universal intellectual will furnish us with the ground to construct the 
concept of specific intellectual. The second part serves to attain this task. In the third part the 
paper highlights the effectiveness of Specific intellectual. The fourth responds to the critique 
leveled by Hoy and McCarthy on Foucault‟s idea of Specific intellectual. Finally, the idea of 
specific intellectual is defended. 
                            
SPECIFIC INTELLECTUAL VS UNIVERSAL INTELLECTUAL 
Foucault rejects the notion of universal intellectual generally embedded in the Western tradition 
and specifically in Marxism. Foucault defines, the universal intellectual is one who is 
“acknowledged [to have] the right of speaking, in the capacity of master of truth and justice. He 
was heard, or purported to make himself heard, as the spokesman of the universal. To be 
intellectual meant something like being the consciousness/conscience of us all” (Foucault 2000,   
126). From this perspective Plato, Augustine, Descartes, Kant, Hegel, Marx etc. all turn up 
universal intellectuals. Here, I will focus upon Marx‟s views on the „intellectual‟ expounded in 
The Communist Manifesto with a view to show that the Communist Manifesto underlies the 
notion of universal intellectual. The choice of Marx is made on the grounds that Foucault himself 
refers to him or to the Marxist leaders in the context of the universal intellectual. In The 
Communist Manifesto Marx/leader of the Communist Party represents all the working classes of 
the world no matter what region/nationality they belong to. Engels states the aim of writing the 
communist manifesto: “the manifesto was published as the platform of the Communist League, a 
workingmen‟s association, first exclusively German and later on international”. All through the 
pages of The Communist Manifesto Marx and Engels speak in the name of working/proletariat 
class. They use the notion of the working class in abstract terms. However they, on many 
occasions, refer to English, French, German, Dutch, Italian, Flemish and Chinese working 
groups. Marx puts “the workingmen have no country” (Marx 2007, 28). Additionally, Marx and 
Engels give the impression that they are very well aware of the problems and the forms of 
exploitation which the proletariat class goes through in different parts of the world.  
 
Lyotard draws the implications of universal intellectual. He argues that the category of 
universal intellectual presupposes the notion of universal truth. He writes, “it seems to me that 
“intellectuals” are more like thinkers who situate themselves in the position of man, humanity, 
the nation, the people, the proletariat, the creature, or some such category. That is to say, they are 
thinkers who identify themselves with a subject endowed with a universal value so as to describe 
and analyze a situation or a condition from this point of view and to prescribe what ought to be 
done in order for this subject to realize itself, are at least in order for its realization to progress. 
The „intellectuals‟ address each individual in so far as each is the repository or the embryo of a 
third entity. Their statements refer to and arise from the individual according to the same rule. 
The responsibility of “intellectuals” is inseparable from the shared idea of a universal subject. It 
alone can give Voltaire, Zola, Peguy, Sartre (to say within the confines of France) that authority 
that has been accorded to them. Lyotard, like Foucault, argues that there is no shared universal 
identity on the basis of which the intellectual could speak for others.  It does not mean that “there 
is no need to get involved in the fate of the most disadvantaged: ethical and civic responsibility 
demand that one should. But the point of view only allows defensive and local interventions. 
Extended beyond such interventions, it can mislead thought as it misled Sartre‟s (Lyotard 1993, 
3-7). 
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Foucault argues that in the face of historical contingencies and diffused power networks 
interwoven with all forms of knowledge one cannot resort to the universal truth. Because of this 
reason every society has and will have its own „regime of truth‟. Foucault defines the „regime of 
truth‟ as procedures and techniques through which certain statements turn up true and false.  
True and false are relative to the techniques and procedures of the given society.  Foucault also 
rejects the idea of universal intellectual on the grounds of limited knowledge the intellectual 
always has. The intellectual cannot have all knowledge about the workers and various forms of 
exploitation across globe. His scope of knowledge is limited and specific to a region. He is 
himself a product of the given conditions of power and knowledge which he cannot transcend 
completely. He cannot exactly know all power relations which are operating outside of his field 
of interest and research. Foucault explains that “it is true that we have to give up hope of ever 
acceding to a point of view that could give access to any complete and definitive knowledge…” 
(Foucault 1984, 47).  
 
Adding further Foucault argues that the workers being part of local power and knowledge 
networks in a given society are totally conscious of their problems and solutions. They do not 
need intellectuals to tell them what is wrong with their conditions and how they are exploited and 
what are the means to overcome them. When they are exploited, they exactly know that they are. 
The intellectual has nothing to do with their conditions and problems. He puts “the workers do 
not need intellectuals to tell them what they are doing; they know perfectly well what they are 
doing. In my view, the intellectual is the guy who is plugged into the information network, not 
the production network. … His role is therefore not to shape a working-class consciousness, as 
that consciousness already exists, to allow that consciousness, that working class knowledge, to 
enter the information system… The intellectual‟s knowledge is always partial compared to 
working-class knowledge‟‟ (Macey 1993, 317-318).  
 
In general Foucault‟s rejection of universal intellectual is the refutation of traditional 
sketch of philosopher informed by the traditions of the Platonism or Modernism. In particular it 
is a rejection of Marx‟s conception of intellectual. When Marx speaks about the proletariat he 
addresses and represents all sections of proletarian class irrespective to the region, nationality, 
religion, and country. Marx when speaking in the name of the Proletariat class he transcends all 
local power relations operating in the given society. By means of this form of transcendence he 
aligns himself with the workers living outside his specific power and knowledge networks. The 
Marxist intellectual transcends on the presumption of universal truth. It is hoped within the 
Marxist traditions that the force of universal truth would get together the public scattered around 
the different parts of universe and unites different people belonging to different regions, religions 
and cultures into one class.  
 
The workers are presumed to share something common and essential because of which 
nationality, religion, civilization, culture or region turns out to be of no significant importance 
and use. To Marx, what unites various people of different races, nationalities, cultures or 
religions is the surplus labor (Marx 2007, 22, 28). It constitutes the essence of workers. The idea 
of „surplus labor‟ gives us a strong sense of Marx‟s humanistic conception of human being. The 
concept of „surplus labor‟ shows that the labor of working class cannot be treated as a means to 
the external end even though one class legally owns the means of production and the other class 
has no other means of subsidence except labor. The idea of surplus labor presupposes that human 
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beings are end in themselves. It becomes clear that Marx draws the notion of surplus labor upon 
the Kantian frame work. However, he turns the Kantian transcendentalism into historical 
materialism. This conception of human being informed by the metaphysics of Kant unites all 
individuals of the world no matter where they live and no matter what they believe in. The truth 
of surplus labor furnishes Marx with ground to transcend all contingent power networks and calls 
for the organization of global struggle against capitalism.  
 
In contrast to the conception of „universal intellectual‟ Foucault introduces „specific 
intellectual‟. Foucault argues that the intellectual cannot have access to absolute and complete 
knowledge of historical limits. The intellectual can only be an expert of what he knows and 
experiences. The intellectual can be expert within specific sectors, at the precise points where 
their own conditions of life or work situate them (housing, the hospital, the asylum, the 
laboratory, the university, family, and sexual relations). The concrete situation in which 
intellectual works gives him much more immediate and concise awareness of the struggles that 
are going through and within those networks. The intellectual who remains outside these 
networks cannot have its expertise. From the perspective of the Foucauldian intellectual Macey 
argues that Foucault himself does not live up to the demands of his own theory. He identifies 
incoherence between Foucault‟s theory and practice. Macy argues that Foucault theoretically 
cannot offer comments on the issues of which he is not an actual part.  But, in fact, on number 
occasions he lent his name to a Third Wordlist journal which dealt with mainly North Africa. 
Foucault nowhere in his writings has written about the struggles of Polisario in Western Sahara; 
therefore being agreed to act as a nominal editor for journal to which he has no expertise is going 
against his own stated stand (Macey 1993, 292) However, to Foucault, the intellectual has to be 
specific and precise. He is supposed to explore the points where change is possible and desirable. 
The identification of specific locations of desired transformation requires the highest level of 
precision. The intellectual cannot abstractly identify the points for change. For concrete 
transformation the intellectual has to be specific and precise. He cannot and must not launch the 
global struggle against the imprecise points, even though they are desirable. Foucault defines 
„specific intellectual‟ as one who tries to isolate in his power of constraint the system of thought 
that has become familiar to us, that appears self-evident and is integral with  perceptions,  
attitudes and  behaviors. One, therefore, needs to collaborate with practitioners- not only to 
modify the institutions and practices, but to reshape the forms of thought (Ibid,   384). Foucault 
in an answer to a question: do you regard yourself as a „specific intellectual‟? He replies, “Yes, I 
do. I work in a specific field and do not produce a theory of the world. Even if, in practice, 
whenever one works in a particular field, one can do so only by having or arriving at a particular 
point of view (Foucault 1988, 108). 
 
Foucault explains that the figure of specific intellectual has emerged during the World 
War II. He marks the atomic scientist, Oppenheirmer, as a specific intellectual. According to 
Foucault, Oppenheirmer acted as a point of transition between universal and specific intellectual 
because he had direct and localized relation to scientific knowledge and with the institutions 
working on atomic research which made him an effective spokesman against nuclear technology. 
The discourse of atomic research put Oppenheirmer at the middle of the specific and universal 
intellectual. What he said, affected not only a specific sector but to the whole world. That is why 
“the atomic expert brought into play his specific position in the order of knowledge. And for the 
first time, I think, the intellectual was hounded by political powers, no longer on account of a 
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general discourse he conducted but because of the knowledge at his disposal” (Foucault 2000, 
128). The specific intellectual is an expert in his field of research. Deleuze gives an account of 
the Foucauldian intellectual.  He writes, “the intellectual has changed face (as well as the 
function of writing), it is because his very position has changed and he now tends to move from 
one specific place or point to another, that of the „atomic physicist or geneticist or information 
technologist or pharmacologist, and so on‟, in this way producing effects not of universality but 
of transversality, and functioning as an exchanger or privileged junction” (Deleuze 1988, 91). 
And, the extension of techno-scientific structures in the economic and strategic domain has given 
him his real importance too. Foucault explains:  
(Because of these developments) the figure in which the functions and prestige of this 
intellectual are concentrated is no longer that of the „‟writer of genius‟‟ but that of 
„‟absolute savant‟‟ no longer he who bears the values of all, opposes the unjust sovereign 
or his ministers and makes his cry resound even beyond the grave. It is, rather, he who, 
along with others, has at his disposal- whether in the service of the state or against it- 
powers that can either benefit or irrevocably destroy life… Meanwhile, we are at present 
experiencing the disappearance of the figure of the „great writer‟ (Ibid, 129).  
    
THE TASK OF THE SPECIFIC INTELLECTUAL TO CHALLENGE THE PATTERNS 
OF THINKING 
Foucault argues that the job of the specific intellectual is to explore the limits of reason so as to 
go beyond them. The intellectual has to create the space for thinking differently, what he calls 
„transformation‟. Transformation i.e. thinking differently cannot be attained as long as one‟s 
thought rests upon the contemporary limits of reason. Additionally and necessarily the limits of 
reason cannot be contested inasmuch as they are not being turned into contingencies, 
arbitrariness and chances (Best 1995, 119). In this way the intellectual has to accomplish a 
mounting task. He has to concretely work upon historical limits to “grasp the points where 
change is possible and desirable, and to determine precisely how the change should take place 
(Foucault 1984, 46). It is by means of „writings‟ the intellectual calls the contemporary limits of 
reason into question. He clarifies that  “when I study the mechanisms of power, I try to analyze 
their specificity …; and I do it so that those who inserted in certain relations of power, who are 
implicated in them might escape them through their actions of resistance and rebellion, might 
transform them in order not to be subjected any longer” (Ibid,  174). Foucault is optimistic about 
the role of intellectual. He believes in change and restlessly struggles to bring it about. The 
intellectual aims to challenge what comes about in the form of universal and self-evident in 
modern society. The work which does not question the universal forms of contemporary society 
cannot bring about transformation. It only remains within the same mode of thought which 
Foucault characterizes as a superficial transformation (Ibid, 457). Foucault has actively 
participated in the Groupe de’ Information sur les Prisons (GIP). The aim was to gather 
information regarding the conditions, services, accommodations, diet and facilities available to 
prisoners in the cells. The group surprisingly neither proposed nor demanded better conditions 
and services for the prisoners on the belief that proposals or suggestions  would reinforce „the 
rationality of „imprisonment‟. Foucault knows it very well the demand for better conditions and 
services do not challenge the institution of imprisonment. Instead it strengthens it. Foucault 
explains the task of GIP in terms of „problematizing‟ venture in which an effort has been made to 
question the fundamental rationality and presumptions of the institution of imprisonment (Ibid, 
394-395). 
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Transformation lies in challenging and going beyond what is taken for granted. A real 
change cannot take place just by improving standards of living. That is why Foucault always 
refuses to be a prescriber of solutions since prescribing solutions is another way to legitimatizing 
modern Western society. He explains “my position is that it is not up to us to propose. As soon 
as one „‟proposes‟‟- one proposes a vocabulary, an ideology, which can only have effects of 
domination” (Foucault 1988, 197). Proposing is, in fact, a denial of Critique. To propose is not to 
go beyond what is denied in the contemporary society but to live within what is accepted as 
universal and self-evident. 
 
It is well known that, to Foucault, knowledge cannot be disassociated from the effects of 
power. Knowledge does not necessarily liberate the individuals from domination. And in such 
conditions when knowledge embraces the effects of domination, the intellectual must not appeal 
to such forms of repressive knowledge. In these conditions the responsibility of intellectual is to 
analyze the effects of knowledge that remains, otherwise, unnoticed. For these reasons Foucault 
questions Marx‟s belief that knowledge always liberates and makes human beings sovereign and 
autonomous. Foucault demonstrates that human sciences do not only impart knowledge to the 
seeker but conditions his/her conduct as well. Various sciences dealing with human beings are 
not solely epistemological but rather are normative in orientation. For example, when studying 
the structure of the human body in medicine one not only learns how the human body functions 
but he learns what is to be done to stay healthy. Medical sciences similar to all human sciences 
not only put forward norms of health life but they enforce them through family structures and 
state institutions too. In Foucault‟s perspective, these norms rest upon the principle of 
maximization of docility and utility. Human science for good or worse are limiting the 
possibilities of choices available to individuals in contemporary societies. Under these conditions 
the intellectual is not only supposed to furnish students with knowledge but he is expected to 
bring the normative role of human sciences to the surface. Foucault suspects the long entertained 
belief of Western civilization and Marxism that knowledge and truths always promote freedom. 
He explains:  
 
We live in a social universe in which the formation, circulation, and utilization of 
knowledge present a fundamental question. If the accumulation of capital has been an 
essential feature of our society, the accumulation of knowledge has not been any less so. 
Now, the exercise, production, and accumulation of this knowledge cannot be dissociated 
from the mechanisms of power; complex relations exist which must be analyzed. From 
the sixteenth century on it has always been considered that the development of the forms 
and contents of knowledge was one of the greatest guarantees of the liberation of 
humanity. It is a postulate of our Western civilization that has acquired a universal 
character, accepted more or less by everyone. It is a fact, however, I- was not the first to 
ascertain this- that formation of great systems of knowledge has also had the effects and 
functions of subjection and rule. This leads us to reexamine more or less entirely the 
postulate according to which the development of knowledge is undoubtedly the guarantee 
of liberation (Foucault 1991, 165-166). 
 
Every form of truth and knowledge unavoidably implies power framework and power 
effects. The intellectual has to contest the Marxist belief that knowledge guarantees liberation 
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and justice. He has to demonstrate that there is no necessary relation between knowledge and 
freedom.               
 
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SPECIFIC INTELLECTUAL 
In the context of contesting the patterns of established thinking Foucault states “you see, that is 
why I really work like a dog and l worked like a dog all my life… because my problem is my 
own transformation” (Foucault 1988, 14). Adding further Foucault puts that the role of the 
intellectual is not only difficult but risky as well. The job of the intellectual is difficult because 
he has to go where no one has yet gone and risky because the intellectual does not know in 
advance where and how to end. He writes that “the writing a book is always a risk – the risk, for 
instance, of not pulling it off. When you know in advance where you are going to end up there is 
a whole dimension of experience lacking, namely the risk attached to writing a book that may 
not come off (Ibid, 48). The difficulty and risk are unavoidable parts of intellectual work. For 
Foucault, to work means to try to think something other than what one thought before. The goal 
of a specific intellectual, to Foucault, is not just to point out exactly how things historically 
evolved but to create the possibility of going beyond them. He elaborates “the job of an 
intellectual does not consist is molding the political will of others. It is a matter of performing 
analyses in his or her own field, of interrogating anew the evidences and the postulates, of 
shaking up habits, ways of acting and thinking, of dispelling commonplace beliefs, of thinking a 
new measure of rules and institutions…it is matter of participating in the formation of a political 
will, where [the intellectual] is called to perform a role as a citizen” (Foucault 1991, 11-12). 
 
In reply to a question Foucault says “I absolutely will not play the part of one who 
prescribes solutions. I hold that the role of the intellectual today is not that of establishing laws or 
proposing solutions or prophesying, since by doing that one can only contribute to the 
functioning of a determinate situation of power that to my mind must be criticized” (Foucault 
1991, 157). On another occasion he states: 
 
„‟I think the intellectuals… are abandoning their old prophetic function. 
And by that I do not mean only their claim to predict what will happen, but also the 
legislative function that they so long aspired for: See what must be done, see what is 
good, follow me. In the turmoil that engulfs you all, here is the pivotal point, here is 
where I am‟‟. The Greek wise man, the Jewish prophet, the Roman legislator are still 
models that hunt those who, today, practice the profession of speaking and writing. I 
dream of the intellectual who destroys evidences and generalities, the one who, in the 
inertias and constraints of the present time, locates and marks the weak points, the 
openings , the lines of force, who is incessantly on the move, does not know exactly 
where he is heading nor what he will think tomorrow for he is too attentive to the 
present…”(Foucault 1988, 124). 
 
The specific intellectual is neither a prophet nor a legislator. Foucault‟s refusal to play the 
role of reform does not establish that there is nothing to be done or changed but rather there are 
thousands of things that are open and must not be closed through prescribing solutions  (Foucault 
1991, 173-174). He is simply a critic-reformer. He feels ashamed to fight and to talk for others. 
Deleuze on one occasion told Foucault: “In my view you were the first to teach us a basic lesson; 
speaking for others is shameful” (Macey 1993, 269). Proposing solutions is to limit the options 
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available to others. To Foucault, the problems related to madness, disease, sexuality, punishment 
and imprisonment surely affect the masses. To Foucault, prescribing solutions is not an 
appropriate way to address them.   Foucault‟s outright refusal to prescribe solutions poses an 
important question: can the intellectual not propose on the basis of what he knows? Or, Does 
Foucault not propose when he proposes not to propose? 
 
Foucault gives a specific meaning to the word „propose‟. When he appropriates the term „ 
not to propose‟ he, perhaps, means to state that do not be a Marxist. We know that proposals 
drawn upon Marxism predominantly revolve around  revolutionary political formation and class 
struggle which Foucault deeply hates.        
 
The „specific intellectual‟ cannot organize the global political movement for change. For, 
all global movements are abstract and imprecise. They rest upon presumptions that are subject to 
criticism. The global movements never call the assumptions into question. Instead, they show 
them self evident. Within these circumstances the movements shape the will of the individuals so 
as to bring about social change. These movements try to gather and convince the individuals on 
the political agenda in order to take control of state machinery.  The specific intellectual cannot 
participate in those movements since the change they seek is not a true change. If (global) 
political parties, by coincidence, question the presumptions upon which they rest they cannot 
motivate the public. To Foucault, drawing the organization of political movement upon 
universality would necessarily return the effects of domination (Foucault 1988, 197). The 
specific intellectual cannot tolerate the formation of global movements. Foucault rejects the 
possibility of playing such a role. He writes:  
 
I have absolutely no desire to play the role of a prescriber of solutions. I think that the 
role of the intellectual today is not to ordain, to recommend solutions, to prophesy, 
because in that function he can only contribute to the functioning of a particular power 
situation that, in my opinion, must be criticized.  
I understand why the political parties prefer to have relations with intellectuals who offer 
solutions. In this way they can establish relations between partners; the intellectuals offer 
proposals, the party criticizes it, or formulates another one. I reject the intellectual‟s 
functioning as the political party‟s alter ego, double, and alibi (Foucault 2000, 288). 
 
The specific intellectual not only rejects the role of taking political responsibility but he 
aims to take part in an anti-political role. He tries his best to raise questions, not answers, makes 
them so complex that the answers does not suddenly appear in the head of a party‟s political 
bureau. He not only refuses to offer solutions but attempts to make them complex. In the face of 
complexity of modern society there are no simple solutions. The specific intellectual tries 
“instead to pose problems, to make them active, to display them in such complexity that they can 
silence the prophets and lawgivers, all those who speak for others or to others” (Foucault 2000, 
288; Foucault 1991, 159). The specific intellectual does not create the complexity. Instead, he 
demonstrates what is shown to be simple is extremely complex. Complexity reflects the modern 
structures and their interconnections. To Foucault, it is the political tacit to mask complexity with 
simplicity. For, politics looks for simple solutions for complex problems.   
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In order to find out the solutions of problems such as of insanity modern politics looks up 
to the proper role of family and growth of family institution as remedy. Modern politics does not 
consider family as a part and parcel of much broader problem.  Let me give an example from 
Pakistan. Pakistan Tahrik-e-Insaf, political party, led by Imran Khan argues that the root cause of 
Pakistan‟s problems is corruption. When he (Imran Khan) would be elected as the Prime 
Minister of Pakistan he would simplu end corruption and strengthen state institutions to control 
it. For political reasons he translates an extremely complex issue into simple terms. Showing that 
corruption or insanity is very complex which cannot simply be traced to state or family 
institution might disturb the established patterns of thinking and practice. This transformation, 
not the transformation through solutions, gives new impetus to freedom. In the perspective of 
Foucault political struggle cannot bring about change in the society by proposing simple 
solutions to complex problems. Foucault argues that “I do not have the impression that the 
political parties have produced anything at all interesting in the way of the problematization of 
social life… Intellectual political sterility appears to me to be one of the salient facts of our time” 
(Foucault, 2000, 396). For Foucault, the intellectual by definition cannot be political in the sense 
of problematizing the patterns of thinking. However, Marx believes that the responsibility of the 
intellectual is to shape the will of masses so as to guide them to revolution. In the Marxist frame 
work there is no possibility of an intellectual work without resorting to politics. The thesis of 
Marx that " intellectuals have only interpreted the world but the point is to change it”, reflects 
that it is only politics which gives a hope for change and revolution. 
 
RESPOND TO HOY AND MCCARTHY’S CRITICISM 
The discussion above shows that the task of specific intellectual is deeply personal, 
individualistic, specific, predominantly academic, notoriously difficult, highly risky and anti-
political. These characteristics by and large make Foucault‟s project apparently unappealing and 
apolitical. In addition it raises questions and attracts critiques. It is beyond the remit of this paper 
to discuss all these critiques. At present I will focus upon David Cousin Hoy and McCarthy‟s 
critical response to Foucault‟s project. From the standpoint of the critical theory Hoy and 
McCarthy develop the critique of Foucault‟s project. We know that the tradition of critical theory 
is much sympathetic to the fundamentals of Marx. Hoy and McCarthy‟s reading of Foucault is 
undoubtedly drawn upon the Marxist tradition.  They argue that Foucault‟s project would fail to 
attract the people for the simple reason that it does not address the real problems of public. 
Foucault‟s project being personal and purely intellectual in orientation would fail to bring about 
the social change (Hoy and McCarthy 1994, 234). They contest Foucault‟s project on the 
conviction that the masses or collectivity can bring about social change. However, Hoy and 
McCarthy, perhaps, may not reject the chance of personal transformation which, to them, will 
have no more than psychological significance. Hoy and McCarthy are right to argue that 
Foucault‟s critique of modern society would unable to turn the public into a mass movement. 
This is itself acknowledged as well as valued by Foucault. Foucault does not consider it a flaw 
but the strength of his critique. Foucault argues that when the intellectual just offers techniques, 
not specific solutions, for particular problems he does a much radical work.  He states “it is a 
strenuous labor that aims at changes much more radical than would be the case if I were asked to 
work at drafting a law that regulates…” (Foucault 1991, 162). Changing the patterns of thinking 
and acting is more important and profound than that of proposing a solution for a problem. It is 
argued against Foucault‟s stand that when struggle does not involve the public it would 
necessarily fail to develop the effective resistance against capitalism (Best, 1995, 128,129). 
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Foucault explains that he is very much, not in a traditional sense, concerned about the problems 
of society and he wishes to effectively address them at their proper locations.  
 
The intellectual is engaged in the task of dismantling the established habits, breaching 
necessities, calling into question what is supposed to be self-evident and thinking what has not 
been thought before. The role of the intellectual does not consist in telling others what they must 
do. What right would they have to do that? And remember all prophesies, promises, injunctions, 
and programmers that intellectuals managed to formulate in the course of the last two centuries 
(Foucault 1991, 157). 
 
Does the critical work disengage the intellectual from the problems of society especially 
when he is engaged in the activity of suspension and creating the space for thinking differently? I 
think that it does not disassociate him from society as long as the intellectual what Foucault calls 
is „specific‟. Hoy and McCarthy misunderstood the stand of Foucault when they criticize 
Foucault for not involving the members of society (Hoy and McCarthy 1994, 234). From 
Foucault‟s standpoint the intellectual should only offer analysis, tools, techniques, and 
procedures through which the individual can make choices themselves, not to give them 
directions or prescribe solutions. He links his own role with the role of atomic scientist, 
Oppenheirmer, to explain the significance of the project launched by the specific intellectual. 
Foucault argues that over the period of time the various forms of rationality have gradually 
permeated within the institutions of modern society. The multifarious forms of rationality such as 
those operating behind the nuclear weapons, health, power, economy, state, law, capital, 
education, family, media etc. are highly diffused and permeated within the social structures. The 
change within these forms of rationalities cannot be brought about through mass movements. 
The change needs the specific intellectual. That is why Foucault does not call for a revolutionary 
movement but a critique that is precise, well directed and limited. This is the only route through 
which change can be brought about.    
 
CONCLUSION 
The notion of universal intellectual is constructed in isolation of modern society. It is drawn 
upon the fallacious belief that changes spring from the capture of state apparatus. In modern 
society there are neither universal point of resistance nor universal subjects to organize a global 
revolutionary movement. The locations are specific, the points are precise, the fields are 
specialized and the intellectuals are local experts. Under these conditions the role of the expert, 
specific intellectual, becomes highly relevant and viable in comparison to the role of universal 
intellectual who understands modern society from an abstract and isolated perspective.      
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